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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-3926

SAMUEL W. AMOH,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Agency No. A96 265-643
Immigration Judge: Henry S. Dogin

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 6, 2006

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
( Filed: November 14, 2006 )

OPINION

BARRY, Circuit Judge
Petitioner, Samuel W. Amoh, a native of Ghana and a citizen of Liberia, petitions
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal,
and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the following
reasons, we will deny the petition.
I.
Amoh entered the United States on October 9, 2002 as a visitor for pleasure and
was authorized to remain in the country until April 9, 2003. Having failed to leave the
country by that date, he was served by the Department of Homeland Security with a
Notice to Appear, which alleged that he was removable as a non-immigrant who
remained in the United States for a period of time longer than permitted, in violation of
section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(1)(B). He filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under CAT, and, at a November 4, 2003 hearing, conceded the charge while
reasserting his various claims for relief.
A hearing on Amoh’s application was held on February 20, 2004. Amoh testified
that he was born in Ghana and later relocated to, and was naturalized in, Liberia.1 Amoh,
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The original Notice to Appear charged that Amoh is a native and citizen of Ghana.
At the November 4, 2003 hearing, Amoh asked that the Notice be amended to reflect that
he is a native and citizen of Liberia. The IJ granted this request. At the February 20, 2004
hearing, however, the IJ noted that Amoh was born in Ghana and had obtained a passport
there, and changed the Notice to reflect that Amoh was a native of Ghana and a citizen of
Liberia. All parties agree that Amoh was naturalized in Liberia in 1968. No evidence was
presented regarding Amoh’s brief stay in Ghana, and no argument made that his stay in
Ghana has any legal significance for purposes of this application.
2

his wife, and his wife’s family, the latter two belonging to the Krahn ethnic group, were
involved in the political party supporting Samuel Doe. In 1989, civil war broke out, as
rebels supporting Charles Taylor entered the country via the Ivory Coast.
Following the outbreak of civil war, Amoh began to experience trouble with rebel
“lawlessness.” (A.R. 206.) In June 1990, rebels entered the campus of the National
Youth Center, where Amoh taught classes in metal construction and masonry. The rebels
tied up Amoh along with seven other staff members, broke into a vault on the campus,
stole money, and eventually killed the school’s accountant and four other staff members.
Amoh was not harmed.
Seeking to avoid the erupting violence, Amoh took his family and fled to KunTown, a village deep in the Liberian forest. In Kun-Town, rebels engaged in a seemingly
relentless onslaught on “[e]verybody that they [met] there” (A.R. 206), as they stole food
and raped women and children. Amoh’s wife was raped and the rebels forced Amoh to
stand alongside and sing. Following this incident, the rebels learned of Amoh’s
association with Samuel Doe’s government. Frightened, Amoh and his family fled to the
village of Shelo, in the Foya area bordering Guinea. From 1992–2001, the family
remained in Shelo and endured frequent harassment from the rebels.
In 2001, the family headed across the border to Guinea. Shortly thereafter,
Amoh’s wife and their children relocated to a refugee camp in Ghana, where they remain
to this day. Amoh did not join them, but, rather, returned to Foya. There, further rebel

3

violence—this time by rebels looking to oust Charles Taylor—plagued Amoh. Amoh left
in March 2002. He obtained a passport in Ghana and traveled to the United States.
In addition to his experiences with the rebels, Amoh testified that his wife’s uncle,
who was a tribunal chairman under Samuel Doe, was executed and that his mother and
brother were also killed.2
Following the hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision denying Amoh’s application
but granting voluntary departure, or, on his failure to so depart, ordering him to be
removed to Liberia. The IJ concluded that Amoh had not carried his burden of showing
that the acts of persecution he allegedly suffered were related in any way to the five
enumerated grounds provided in the INA for qualification as a “refugee.” Rather,
according to the IJ, Amoh was the victim of “what has happened to most people in
Liberia” caught in the midst of “a horrible, tragic civil war,” i.e. “general violence at the
hands of the rebels.” (A.R. 120–21.) In addition, the IJ determined that Amoh, despite an
open line of communication with his family in Ghana, failed to offer corroboration
supporting his claims that various family members were killed on account of their
political opinions. By order dated July 20, 2005, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision
without opinion.
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Amoh testified that his father-in-law was arrested with his wife’s uncle, but he did
not testify as to his father-in-law’s fate. (A.R. 155–56.) In his asylum application, Amoh
indicated that he was, in fact, killed.
4

II.
To qualify for the discretionary relief of asylum, an applicant must establish that he
is a “refugee,” as that term is defined in section 101(a)(42) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A). In order to meet this definition, the applicant must show that he or she is
“unable or unwilling to return to . . . [his] country [of nationality] because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution,” id., and has “the burden of showing that the
persecution was on account of the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion,” Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 170 (3d
Cir. 2003). In order for the persecution to qualify under the statute, “the persecutor must
be motivated, at least in part, by one of the enumerated grounds.” Lukwago, 329 F.3d at
170.
To be eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant must “demonstrate[] a
‘clear probability’ that, upon return to his or her home country, his or her ‘life or freedom
would be threatened’ on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.” Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).
In order to receive protection under CAT, the applicant must “establish that it is
more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country
of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person. Id. §
208.18(a)(1).
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Where, as here, the BIA affirms a decision of the IJ without opinion, we review
the IJ’s decision. Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005). Review is
conducted under the substantial evidence standard, which requires us to examine the IJ’s
findings to determine whether they are “supported by evidence that a reasonable mind
would find adequate.” Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247–49 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
We may reverse a finding of the IJ only when “no reasonable fact finder could make that
finding on the administrative record.” Id. at 249. With respect to an IJ’s finding regarding
“the availability of corroborating evidence,” the REAL ID Act of 2005 dictates that we
not reverse that finding unless “a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that
such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D).
III.
Amoh makes two principal arguments. First, he argues that the streamlining
regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice, which allow, among other things,
review of an IJ’s decision by a single member of the BIA and affirmance without opinion,
violate due process. See Pet.’s Br. at 16–27; see e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e). Second,
Amoh contends that the IJ’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. See
Pet.’s Br. at 27–34. We disagree.
First, Amoh’s due process argument is frivolous. We held, almost three years ago,
that the very procedures he contests do not run afoul of due process. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353
F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). In Dia, we were faced with the same procedural
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posture present here—affirmance without opinion of an IJ’s decision by a single member
of the BIA. Id. at 247. Given that “ ‘an alien has no constitutional right to any
administrative appeal at all,’ ” id. at 242 (quoting Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 376
(1st Cir. 2003)), we had no trouble concluding that review “done by one member of the
BIA” whose ruling was “not accompanied by a fully reasoned BIA decision” was not
“constitutionally ‘unfair,’ ” id. at 243–44. In addition, far from having to guess at the
reasoning of the BIA, we determined that the IJ’s decision provided the agency’s
reasoning for purposes of our review. Id. at 240–44.
Amoh’s attack on the IJ’s findings is similarly unavailing. The IJ concluded that
Amoh had not shown that he was persecuted on account of one of the five enumerated
grounds provided in the INA. According to the IJ, “Whatever harm may [have]
occur[red] to the wife or any harassment that he received occurred because he was a
Liberian citizen[,] that he was not a rebel, and they were torturing, harming, and raping
anybody.” (A.R. 118.)
This conclusion has abundant support in the record. For example, Amoh testified
that when rebels invaded the National Youth Center they took money and killed the
accountant but they did not harm him. According to Amoh, they wanted “the money.”
(A.R. 163.) Amoh’s wife was raped in Kun-Town, but, tellingly, he testified that the
perpetrators did not find out about his association with Samuel Doe’s government until
after that incident occurred. Similarly, Amoh testified that the various other forms of
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harassment he suffered happened to everybody. Quite simply, Amoh provided no
evidence, much less evidence sufficient to reverse the IJ’s decision, that any abuse he
suffered was motivated by his status with the government, his wife’s ethnic background,
or any other ground enumerated in the INA.
Similarly, the IJ’s conclusion that Amoh failed to offer corroboration regarding the
alleged persecution suffered by his family is supported by substantial evidence. The IJ
identified numerous areas where corroborating evidence would be available, such as
documents regarding the lives and deaths of Amoh’s mother, brother, father-in-law, and
wife’s uncle. In addition, the IJ correctly noted that Amoh has an open line of
communication with his wife in Ghana and that there was no reasonable explanation for
Amoh’s failure to provide such evidence.
Finally, the IJ’s conclusions that Amoh has not shown a well-founded fear of
future persecution or that it is more likely than not he will be tortured upon his return to
Liberia are supported by substantial evidence.3
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
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Having failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution for purposes of
eligibility for asylum, Amoh was, by definition, unable to establish the clear probability
of harm required to qualify for withholding of removal. See Chen, 376 F.3d at 223.
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